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Abstract
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have
asymmetric information about the prize’s location. We study the social payoff in
equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under
any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have
interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.
Keywords: incomplete information, search duplication, decentralized research,
social welfare. JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83.
1 Introduction
Various real-life situations involve agents exploring different routes to making a discov-
ery. These situations often have the following three key properties: (1) heterogeneity:
agents may differ in terms of their information, search methods, search costs, etc.,
(2) competitive environment: the agents work separately, and compete to be the
successful discoverer, and (3) externality: both the discoverer and society gain from
the discovery, but these gains may differ. For concreteness, consider the following
motivating example.
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Example 1. Society faces a problem of quickly developing a vaccine for a new in-
fectious disease, such as COVID-19. There are various possible research directions
that may lead to success. Different research labs (or pharmaceutical R&D divisions)
have heterogeneous private information about the most promising route to quickly
develop a vaccine. Society gains if the vaccine is found by at least one lab. A lab that
discovers the vaccine gains from the discovery (credit or reward for the scientists, or
profits for the pharmaceutical firm), and this gain is reduced if multiple labs jointly
make the discovery.
These situations (henceforth, search games) are common in various important ar-
eas such as R&D races in oligopolistic markets (e.g., Loury, 1979; Chatterjee & Evans,
2004; Akcigit & Liu, 2015; Letina, 2016), design of innovation contests (e.g., Erat &
Krishnan, 2012; Bryan & Lemus, 2017; Letina & Schmutzler, 2019), pharmaceutical
research (e.g., Matros & Smirnov, 2016; de Roos et al., 2018), and scientific research
(e.g., Kleinberg & Oren, 2011). While the effects of most of the above-mentioned
properties have been studied extensively in the literature, the idea that agents might
have private information has not gotten much attention. Thus, the main methodolog-
ical innovation of the present model is the introduction of asymmetric information
into search games (as discussed in Section 6).1
The expected social gain (from a successful discovery) is clearly constrained by the
information structure, as we assume that players are competitive and do not share
their private information. The social gain may also be constrained by the fact that
players’ individual preferences can differ from society’s, and players have strategic
considerations as well. Thus, the main question we study is: what is the highest
social payoff in equilibrium?
Highlights of the Model There are n players who search for a prize hidden in
one of a finite set of locations.2 Player i is able to search in at most Ki locations (all
at once). Searching incurs a private cost, which is a convex function of the number
1We are aware of one related existing model of a search game with asymmetric information, that
of Chen et al. (2015). The key difference between our model and theirs is that Chen et al. rely
on enforceable mechanisms, which allow players to safely share their asymmetric information, as
all players must follow a contract once it has been signed. By contrast, we consider a setup in
which players cannot rely on enforceable mechanisms, and, thus, they are limited to playing Nash
equilibria.
2The assumption of having a single prize is common in the literature; see, e.g., Fershtman &
Rubinstein (1997); Konrad (2014); Matros et al. (2019); Liu & Wong (2019).
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of locations in which the player searches. Each player receives some private coarse
signal about the actual location of the prize, and chooses which locations to search.
Specifically, for each player there is a collection of disjoint subsets of locations (namely,
a partition), such that her private signal informs the player in which of these subsets
the prize resides (a more general information structure is analyzed in Section 5).
We study a one-shot game (i.e., if the prize is not found, players do not get to search
again) with simultaneous actions. This assumption, which differs from the dynamic
models studied in many of the papers cited above, may be reasonable in situations
in which there is severe urgency to make the discovery, such as in the motivating
example (see Section 6 for further discussion, and Section 3.3 for examples of what
happens when this assumption is relaxed).
We allow the prize’s value to depend on the location. Also, the value for society
and the individual values for players may all be different. When multiple players
search in the same location (“search duplication”), it reduces the reward that each
player will receive in case the prize is indeed there. By contrast, the social value of
the prize is unaffected by the number of finders (and it is not affected by the players’
search costs).
First Main Result Our answer to the question of what society can achieve in
equilibrium consists of two main results. The first states that there exists a (pure)
equilibrium that yields the first-best social payoff (namely, the highest social payoff
that any strategy profile can yield) if the following two conditions hold for any two
locations ω and ω′ that a player considers possible (after observing her own private
signal): (1) consistency: the player and society have the same ordinal ranking between
searching (by herself) in ω and in ω′, and (2) solitary-search dominance: the player
always prefers searching ω by herself to searching ω′ with other players, or to not
searching at all.
It is relatively easy to see that neither condition can be dropped (see the examples
presented in Section 3.3). As for their sufficiency, the intuition is that no player has
an incentive to “spoil” society’s payoff by moving from a socially better location to a
worse one, nor by moving from a location that she searches alone to a location that
others search. Note, however, that not all equilibria yield the first-best payoff (see
the example illustrated in Figure 2). We discuss the implications of this result on the
design of innovation contests in Section 3.4.
3
Second Main Result Our second main result characterizes the first-best social
payoff. We show that the first-best payoff is constrained only by compatibility with
the information structure, where the compatibility condition is in the spirit of Hall’s
marriage theorem (Hall, 1935). Our proof relies on representing a search game as
a bipartite graph and adapting and extending classic results from graph theory, the
max-flow min-cut theorem (Ford & Fulkerson, 1956), and the Birkhoff–von Neumann
theorem (Birkhoff, 1946; Von Neumann, 1953) to our setup.3
One interesting implication of this result (presented in Section 4.1) is that the
first-best payoff would not increase if we modified our setup and allowed players to
coordinate partial search efforts within locations, so that their efforts do not overlap
(i.e., when two players each assign an effort of 50% to location ω, the prize is always
found, if it is in ω).
Structure Section 2 presents our model. We study the existence of an equilibrium
with a first-best social payoff in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes the first-best
payoff. In Section 5 we consider more general information structures. We conclude
and discuss the relations with the literature in Section 6. Appendix A applies our
results to a special class of search games. Appendix B presents the formal proofs.
2 Model
Setup Let N = {1,2, ...,n} be a finite set of players. A typical player is denoted by
i. We use −i to denote the set of all players except player i. We describe the private
information of the players in terms of knowledge partitions (Aumann, 1976). Let Ω
be the set of the states of the world (henceforth, states). Nature chooses one state
ω ∈ Ω that is the true state of the world. Each player i is endowed with Πi, which is
a partition of Ω, namely, a list of disjoint subsets of Ω whose union is the whole Ω.
We refer to the elements of player i’s partition (i.e., the subsets) as player i’s cells.
For each state ω, let pii (ω) denote the cell of player i that contains the state ω. If the
true state is ω, then player i knows that the true state is one of the states in pii (ω).
3Recent economic applications (and extensions) of these graph-theory results have appeared in
matching mechanisms (e.g., Budish et al., 2013; Bronfman et al., 2018), large anonymous games
(e.g., Blonski, 2005), public good games with multiple resources (e.g., Tierney, 2019), and auctions
of multiple discrete items (e.g., Ben-Zwi, 2017).
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Note that the knowledge partitions framework is equivalent to a model in which
each player observes a private random signal. Each cell of player i’s partition cor-
responds to a different realization of her private signal. W.l.o.g., one may view the
partition Πi as the set of possible realizations of player i’s private signal itself; i.e.,
each cell in Πi is a possible signal, and if the state of the world is ω then player i
observes the signal pii (ω).
The players search for a prize hidden in one of a finite set of possible locations.
Importantly, in the baseline model we assume that the location of the prize determines
the private signal of each player (in other words, the signals that players observe are
a deterministic function of the prize’s location). This implies that w.l.o.g. each state
of the world in our model corresponds to a different location of the prize.4 Hence, we
identify the finite set of locations with the set of states Ω. When a player searches in
location (i.e., state) ω ∈ Ω, she finds the prize if the location of the prize is ω (i.e., if
the true state of the world is ω).
Figure 1 demonstrates an information structure in a two-player search game.
Figure 1: Illustration of information structure of a two-player search game
Let µ ∈∆(Ω) denote the (common) prior belief about the prize’s location, where
∆(Ω) denotes the set of distributions over Ω. For a subset of locations E ⊆ Ω, let
µ(E) = ∑ω∈E µ(ω) denote the prior probability of E. For non-triviality, we assume
that every cell has a positive prior probability, i.e., µ(pii) > 0 for every pii ∈ Πi and
i∈N . When the (unknown) location of the prize is ω, each player i assigns a posterior
belief of µ(ω′|pii (ω)) to the location being ω′, where
µ
(
ω′|pii (ω)
)
=

µ(ω′)/µ(pii(ω)) ω′ ∈ pii (ω)
0 ω′ 6∈ pii (ω) .
4In Section 5 we discuss a more general model that dispenses with the above assumption.
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We allow heterogeneity in the maximal number of locations that each player can
search. Specifically, each player i chooses up toKi ∈N locations in which she searches,
where Ki is the player’s search capacity. A (pure) strategy of player i is a function si
that assigns to each cell pii ∈Πi a subset of pii with at most Ki elements. We interpret
si (pii) as the set of up to Ki locations in which player i searches when she observes the
signal pii. If no ambiguity can arise, we may also say that player i (ex-ante) searches
in location ω, if ω ∈ si (pii (ω)), i.e., if player i searches in ω when the prize is located
in5 ω.
We focus in the present paper on pure strategies. Let Si ≡ Si (G) denote the
set of all (pure) strategies of player i, and let S ≡ S (G) = ∏i∈N Si be the set of
strategy profiles in the game G. For example, in Figure 1 Player 1, with a capac-
ity of one, has four pure strategies. One such strategy, denoted by s1, is given by
(s1 (pi1) = ω2; s1 (pi′1) = ω3); i.e., a player following s1 searches in location ω2 upon ob-
serving signal pi1 and searches in ω3 upon observing pi′1. Suppose that Player 1 follows
s1 and the location of the prize is ω4. Then she will observe the signal pi′1 and search
in ω3 (and hence she will not find the prize).
Remark 1. All of our results hold in a more general setup with either of the following
extensions (with minor modifications to the proofs):
1. Heterogeneous priors: each player i has a different prior µi.
2. Heterogeneous restricted locations: each player i is allowed to search only in a
subset Ωi ⊆ Ω of the locations.
Costs, Rewards, and Duplication Searching incurs a private cost, which is a
convex function of the number of locations in which a player searches.6 Specifically,
each player i bears a cost ci (k)≥ 0 when searching within k locations, where ci (0) = 0
and ci (k+ 1)−ci (k)≥ ci (k)−ci (k−1) for any k ∈ {1, ..,Ki−1}. We say that a game
has a costless search (up to the capacity constraints) if ci ≡ 0 (i.e., if ci (k) = 0 for
every k ∈ {1, ..,Ki} and every player i).
5Equivalently, the locations in which player i (ex-ante) searches are ∪pii∈Πi si (pii), namely, the
union (across all her cells) of the locations she searches within each cell when that cell happens to
be her signal.
6Extending the costs to depend also on which locations, not just how many, are being searched
may be an interesting direction for future research.
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For any location ω, let vmi (ω)∈R+ denote the reward for player i when m players,
including player i, find the prize in ω. The reward for finding the prize alone, v1i (ω),
is also called the private value of player i (at location ω). We assume that the finder’s
reward is weakly decreasing in the number of joint finders (i.e., vm+1i (ω) ≤ vmi (ω)
for any m and ω), which reflects the negative impact of search duplication. Two
examples of such decreasing rewards that are commonly used in the literature are
(1) vmi (ω) = 1m ·v1i (ω), which may correspond to a setup in which one of the players
who search in the prize’s location is randomly chosen to be its undisputed owner,
and she gains the prize’s full value (see, e.g., Fershtman & Rubinstein, 1997), and
(2) vmi (ω) = 0 for any m ≥ 2 and any ω, which corresponds to a setup in which
a (Bertrand) price competition between the pharmaceutical firms or a “credit war”
between the research labs destroys the finder’s reward in case of a joint discovery
(e.g., Chatterjee & Evans, 2004; Matros & Smirnov, 2016; de Roos et al., 2018).
In addition to the players, we introduce an external entity, society, who is not one
of the players and is indifferent to the identity of the prize finder, as long as the prize is
found. In our normative analysis we set the objective of maximizing society’s payoff.
One can think of society as representing a government who cares for the welfare of
those in society (e.g., consumers or patients) who will be affected by the discovery.
For any location ω, let vs (ω)∈R+ denote the prize’s social value for society when the
prize is found in ω. Note that the social value does not depend on the identity or the
number of the prize’s finders. In particular, the social value of the prize is not reduced
when there are multiple finders, which seems plausible in many setups. For example,
it seems plausible that price competition between competing pharmaceutical firms
will not harm society (it might even benefit the consumers), and that the social gain
from a new discovery is not likely to be reduced when two scientists fight over the
credit. Further note that in our model society disregards the players’ search costs.
This modeling choice seems reasonable in setups where the potential social impact
of a discovery overshadows (in society’s eyes) the player’s individual gains and costs,
as in the motivating example of finding a vaccine. In other setups this assumption
might be less appropriate, and we leave for future research the interesting question of
how to extend our model and our results to a social value that accounts for players’
costs (bearing in mind that players may differ both in their costs and in their reward
function).
We say that the game has common values if v1i (ω) = v1j (ω) = vs (ω) for every two
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players i, j ∈N and every location ω ∈ Ω.
Summarizing all the above components allows us to define a search game as a
tuple G= (N,Ω,Π,µ,K,c,v), with the various components as defined above.
Private Payoffs and Equilibrium Fix a strategy profile s∈ S. Let ms (ω) denote
the number of players who search in ω when the prize’s location is ω, i.e.,
ms (ω) =
∑
i∈N
1ω∈si(pii(ω)).
The reward (resp., cost) of player i conditional on the prize’s location being ω is
equal to 1ω∈si(pii(ω))v
ms(ω)
i (ω) (resp., ci (|si (pii (ω))|)). Thus, the (net) payoff of player
i conditional on the prize’s location being ω, denoted by ui (s|ω), is
ui (s|ω) = 1ω∈si(pii(ω))v
ms(ω)
i (ω)− ci (|si (pii (ω))|) .
The players and society are both risk neutral with respect to their payoffs. The
(ex-ante) expected (net) payoff of player i is given by ui (s) =
∑
ω∈Ω µ(ω) ·ui (s|ω) .
A strategy profile s= (s1, ..., sn) is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of search game
G if no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium; i.e., if for every
player i and every strategy s′i the following inequality holds: ui (s)≥ ui (s′i, s−i) , where
s−i describes the strategy profile played by all players except player i.
Social Payoff Fix a strategy profile s ∈ S. Let U (s|ω) = vs (ω) ·1ms(ω)≥1 denote
the social payoff, conditional on the prize’s location being ω. The expected social
payoff is equal to U (s) = ∑ω∈Ω µ(ω) ·U (s|ω). Let Uopt denote the socially optimal
payoff (or the first-best payoff): Uopt = maxs∈SU (s) . A strategy profile s is socially
optimal if it achieves the socially optimal payoff, i.e., if U (s) = Uopt.
A strategy profile is location-maximizing if it maximizes the number of locations
in which the prize is found; i.e., if for any strategy profile s′ ∈ S,
∑
ω∈Ω
1{ms(ω)≥1} ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
1{ms′(ω)≥1}.
The set of socially optimal strategy profiles is typically different from the set of
location-maximizing strategy profiles. The two notions coincide if society assigns the
same value to every location, i.e., if vs (ω) = vs (ω′) for any two locations ω,ω′ ∈Ω. A
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strategy profile is exhaustive if the prize is always found, i.e., if ms (ω)≥ 1 for every
ω ∈ Ω. It is immediate that an exhaustive strategy profile is both socially optimal
and location-maximizing.
3 Socially Optimal Equilibrium
In this section we present conditions under which the strategic constraints (namely,
each player maximizing her private payoff) do not limit the social payoff; that is, we
give sufficient conditions for the existence of socially optimal equilibria.
3.1 Search Games are Weakly Acyclic
A sequence of strategy profiles is an improvement path (Monderer & Shapley, 1996)
if each strategy profile differs from its preceding profile by the strategy of a single
player, who obtained a lower payoff in the preceding profile.
Definition 1. A sequence of strategy profiles (s1, ..., sK) is an improvement path if
for every k ∈ {1, ...,K−1} there exists a player ik ∈ N such that: (1) skj = sk+1j for
every player j 6= ik, and (2) uik
(
sk+1
)
> uik
(
sk
)
.
We begin by presenting an auxiliary result, which states that any search game is
weakly acyclic: starting from any strategy profile, there exists an improvement path
that ends in a Nash equilibrium.7
Definition 2 (Milchtaich, 1996). A game is weakly acyclic if for any s1 ∈ S, there
exists an improvement path (s1, ..., sK), such that sK is a (pure) Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Any search game is weakly acyclic.
Sketch of proof; formal proof is in Appendix B.1. Define the payoff of a cell pii ∈ Πi
as the expected payoff of player i given that her signal is pii. Note that player i is
best-responding iff every cell of i is best-responding. Player i has Ki units of capacity,
7The proof introduces an agent-normal form representation of our game (in the spirit of Selten,
1975), which is similar to matroid congestion games with player-specific payoffs. Ackermann et al.
(2009, Theorem 8) show that these games are weakly acyclic. Their result cannot be directly applied
to our setup, as there are some technical differences; most notably, our cost function being non-linear
(while in Ackermann et al.’s setup the cost of searching in two locations must be the sum of the
costs in each location). Nevertheless, the proofs turn out to be similar.
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which we index by j = 1, . . . ,Ki. A cell-unit of player i is a pair (pii, j), where pii ∈Πi
is a cell, and j a unit index. W.l.o.g. we assume that a strategy chooses a specific
location for every cell-unit α, or chooses that α be inactive. We define the payoff of
a cell-unit (pii, j) as the payoff of the cell pii. Note that this payoff equals the sum
of the (interim) expected rewards in the locations of pii’s active cell-units, minus the
cost of activating that many cell-units.
Given a strategy profile, suppose that there is no single inactive cell-unit whose
activation improves its own (i.e., the cell’s) payoff. Then activating multiple cell-
units does not improve the cell’s payoff either, because of the convexity of the cost
function. The case of deactivation is similar. Therefore, we can show that a cell pii is
best-responding iff every cell-unit of pii is best-responding.
The key part is Lemma 1 that says that if the members of a set B of cell-units (of
various players) are best-responding, and α /∈ B is another cell-unit, then there is a
sequence of cell-unit improvements that ends with all the members of B∪{α} best-
responding. To prove weak acyclicity, start from any profile s1, and using this lemma
inductively add one cell-unit at a time, until eventually everyone is best-responding.
To prove the lemma, we construct a sequence of improvements by the members
of B∪{α}. First, let α switch from its current choice to its best-response. If α was
active before the switch, we add a dummy player in the location ω1 that α left. Now
begins a sequence we call Phase I. Suppose that α switched to some location ω2.
While cell-units (of B∪{α}) not located in ω2 are still best-responding, those in ω2
may now prefer to switch because of the extra cell-unit in ω2 (call ω2 the current
“plus location”). Let one of them switch to its best-response ω3, and then another
cell-unit may switch from ω3, etc. Phase I goes on until everyone is best-responding,
unless someone switches to ω1, in which case Phase I is immediately terminated.
If a cell-unit is deactivated on stage t, it will not incentivize another cell-unit to
deactivate on stage t+ 1, because of the convexity of costs. Moreover, Phase I will
end after stage t, since there would not be any plus location.
To see that Phase I cannot go on forever, consider a cell-unit β that switches from
location ω to location ω′, making ω′ the new plus location. The switch must strictly
increase β’s expected reward, and later the expected reward in ω′ cannot drop below
its current level; it may only be higher (if the plus is somewhere else). Thus, β’s
expected reward will never drop back to the level it was at before the switch, even
if β does not improve again. Therefore, Phase I cannot enter a cycle; hence, it must
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end.
Let σ∗ denote the strategy profile when Phase I ends. At this point we remove
the dummy from ω1, and denote the resulting profile by s∗. If Phase I ended because
someone switched to ω1, then everyone is best-responding under s∗, and we are done.
Otherwise, Phase I ended because everyone was best-responding under σ∗, and now
follows Phase II.
While Phase I can be described as restabilizing after one cell-unit is added, the
analogous Phase II restabilizes after one cell-unit is removed. First, one cell-unit
switches from some location ω′ to the current “minus location” ω1, then another
switches to ω′, etc. On each stage we choose a cell-unit switch that is best for its cell,
i.e., there exists no cell-unit switch that yields a higher increase in that cell’s payoff.
Phase II must eventually end, by the argument analogous to that of Phase I. Then
everyone is best-responding, and the lemma is proven.
In particular, Proposition 1 implies that:
Corollary 1. Any search game admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Existence of a Socially Optimal Equilibrium
We begin by defining two properties required for our first main result (Theorem 1).
Consistency Our first property requires that the ordinal ranking of any player over
her expected private values within a cell is (weakly) compatible with society’s ranking.
That is, we say that a search game has consistent payoffs if for any two locations ω
and ω′ in the same cell of player i, if the expected private value of player i is strictly
lower in ω than in ω′, then the expected social value is weakly lower in ω.
Definition 3. Search game G has consistent payoffs if for any player i, any cell
pii ∈ Πi, and any two locations ω,ω′ ∈ pii, the following implication holds:
µ(ω) ·v1i (ω)< µ
(
ω′
)
·v1i
(
ω′
)
⇒ µ(ω) ·vs (ω)≤ µ
(
ω′
)
·vs
(
ω′
)
.
Observe that having common values implies that the search game has consistent
payoffs. Further observe that if society has uniform expected values (i.e., if µ(ω) ·
vs (ω) = µ(ω′) · vs (ω′) for any two locations ω,ω′ ∈ Ω), then the search game has
consistent payoffs regardless of what the players’ private payoffs are.
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Solitary-Search Dominance Solitary-search dominance requires that any player
always prefer searching alone in any location to (1) searching jointly with other players
in another location within the same cell, or (2) leaving some of her search capacity
unused. Formally:
Definition 4. Search game G has solitary-search dominant payoffs if
µ(ω|pii) ·v1i (ω)≥ µ
(
ω′|pii
)
·v2i
(
ω′
)
(1)
and
µ(ω|pii) ·v1i (ω)≥ ci (Ki)− ci (Ki−1) , (2)
for any player i, any cell pii ∈ Πi, and any pair ω,ω′ ∈ pii.
Next we show that consistency and solitary-search dominance imply that the
search game admits a socially optimal equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Let G be a search game with consistent and solitary-search dominant
payoffs. Then there exists a socially optimal (pure) equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a pure strategy profile that maximizes the social payoff. Proposition
1 implies that there is a finite sequence of unilateral improvements that ends in a Nash
equilibrium. In what follows we show that the properties of consistency and solitary-
search dominance jointly imply that the social payoff cannot decrease along that
sequence. Without loss of generality we can assume that each unilateral improvement
consists of changing merely a single choice within a single cell, since this is in fact
what the proof of Proposition 1 shows.
First we note that in each improvement, if the improving player leaves a location
in which there were multiple searchers, then the social payoff cannot decrease. Next,
solitary-search dominance implies that if she leaves a location in which she is the sole
searcher, then she moves to an unoccupied location, as moving to an occupied location
would contradict (1), and “quitting” (namely, deactivating that unit of capacity)
would contradict (2). Finally, consistency implies that if she moves to being the sole
searcher in another location, then the social payoff must weakly increase.
In the socially optimal equilibrium, search costs may sometimes deter a player from
searching in some location ω if other players might search there as well. Inequality
(2) merely states that she will never be deterred by costs if she can search in ω alone.
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Our next result states that even without the consistency assumption, some effi-
ciency is still guaranteed, in the sense that there exists an equilibrium that maximizes
the number of locations in which the players search. Formally:
Corollary 2. Every search game G with solitary-search dominant payoffs admits a
location-maximizing equilibrium.
Proof. Let Gˆ= (N,Ω,Π,µ,K,c, vˆ) be a search game similar to G= (N,Ω,Π,µ,K,c,v),
except that vˆs (ω) = 1/µ(ω) for any locations ω ∈ Ω. Observe that Gˆ is a search game
with consistent and solitary-search dominant payoffs. This implies that Gˆ admits a
socially optimal equilibrium sˆ. Observe that the definition of vˆs implies that sˆ is a
location-maximizing strategy profile. Further observe that sˆ is also an equilibrium of
G (as G and Gˆ differ only in the social payoff).
In particular, any game with solitary-search dominant payoffs that admits an
exhaustive strategy profile, also admits an exhaustive equilibrium.
Price of Stability/Anarchy Theorem 1 states that there is an equilibrium that
maximizes the social payoff (i.e., that the price of stability is 1)8 in any search game
with consistent and solitary-search dominant payoffs. By contrast, Figure 2 demon-
strates that the social payoff might be substantially lower in other Nash equilibria
(i.e., that the price of anarchy can be more than 1).
3.3 Necessity of All Assumptions in Theorem 1
The following three examples demonstrate that all the assumptions of Theorem 1 are
necessary to guarantee the existence of a socially optimal equilibrium. We postpone
the discussion of the necessity of deterministic signals to Section 5.
Necessity of Solitary-Search Dominance Example 2 demonstrates that solitary-
search dominance is necessary for Theorem 1.
Example 2. For any r ∈ (0,1) let
G=
(
N = {1,2} ,Ω =
{
ω,ω′
}
,Π≡ {Ω} ,µ,K ≡ 1, c≡ 0,
(
v1i ≡ 1,v2i ≡ r,vs ≡ 1
))
8The price of stability (resp., anarchy) is defined as the ratio between the socially optimal payoff
Uopt and the maximal (resp., minimal) social payoff induced by a Nash equilibrium; i.e., PoS =
Uopt
maxs∈NE(G)U(s)
and PoA= Uoptmins∈NE(G)U(s) , where NE (G) is the set of Nash equilibria.
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Figure 2: Example for the price of anarchy. The figure presents two equilibria in
a two-player search game with consistent and solitary-search dominant payoffs (the
ellipses represent the partition elements), uniform prior, costless search (c≡ 0), reward
of vmi ≡ 1m , social value vs ≡ 1, and a capacity of one for every player. The figure
shows the location searched by each player for each possible signal. For example, in
the socially optimal equilibrium Player 1 searches in location ω1 when observing the
signal {ω1} and searches in ω3 when observing the signal {ω2,ω3,ω4}. The first (resp.,
second) equilibrium is (resp., is not) socially optimal with a social payoff of 1 (resp.,
0.75).
be a search game with trivial information partitions (namely, each partition Πi con-
tains a single element, which is the whole Ω), and a prior µ defined as follows: µ(ω) = 23
and µ(ω′) = 13 . Note that G has consistent payoffs, and that it satisfies solitary-search
dominance iff r ≤ 0.5. In what follows we show that for any r > 0.5 the unique best-
reply against an opponent who searches in location ω is to search in ω as well (which
implies that searching in ω is a dominant strategy). This is so because searching
in ω yields an expected payoff of 23 · r, while searching in ω′ yields 13 · 1. This, in
turn, implies that the unique equilibrium is both players searching in ω, which is
suboptimal.
Necessity of Consistency Example 3 demonstrates that the consistency require-
ment is necessary to guarantee the existence of a socially optimal equilibrium. Specif-
ically, it shows that even for one-player search games, and even when society and the
player have the same ordinal ranking over the values of the prize in each location and
search is costless, the unique Nash equilibrium is not necessarily socially optimal if
the consistency requirement is not satisfied.
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Example 3. LetG= (N = {1} ,Ω = {ω,ω′} ,Π1 = {Ω} ,µ,K1 = 1, c1 = 0,v) be a search
game with a prior µ(ω) = 1/4, µ(ω′) = 3/4, and with values of vs (ω) = 2, vs (ω′) = 1,
v11 (ω) = 4, and v
1
1 (ω
′) = 1. Observe that the game’s payoffs are trivially solitary-
search dominant due to having a single player and a costless search. It is simple to
see that the player searches in location ω in the unique equilibrium, although this
yields a lower social payoff than searching in ω′.
Necessity of Simultaneous Searches An (implicit) key assumption in our model
is that all searches are done simultaneously (i.e., a one-shot game). In what follows
we demonstrate that if searches are done sequentially, then Theorem 1 is no longer
true. We present two examples, one of a setup in which a player can observe the
locations in which her opponents searched in the past, and the other of a setup
without observability. Both examples share the following properties: (1) the private
and social values of the prize are equal to δm in all locations, where m is the round in
which the prize is found, for some common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1), (2) there are two
players who play sequentially: player 1 searches in odd rounds and player 2 searches
in even rounds, and (3) search is costless.
Consider first an example with observability of the opponent’s past searches. As-
sume that the prize is hidden within a matrix of locations where player 1 knows the
row and player 2 knows the column. Note that the unique socially optimal strategy
profile finds the prize in at most two rounds: player 1 searches in the correct row
in round 1, and player 2 searches in the prize’s true location in the second round.
Nevertheless, this strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium, as player 1 would gain
by deviating to searching in a wrong row in round 1 (in order to deceive the opponent
about the prize’s row) and searching in the prize’s location in round 3 (after observing
the column in which player 2 searches in round 2).
Next consider an example without observability of past searches. Assume that
there are two locations ω,ω′, and partitions are trivial. In any socially optimal strat-
egy profile, player 1 searches deterministically in round 1 (say, in location ω), and
player 2 searches in the remaining location (ω′) in round 2, which guarantees that
the prize is found within at most 2 rounds. Assume to the contrary that player 1
plays deterministically in round 1 in a Nash equilibrium (say, she searches in ω).
This implies that player 2 searches in the remaining location ω′ in round 2. This, in
turn, implies that player 1 would gain by deviating to searching in ω′ in round 1 (and
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searching in ω in round 3), as this guarantees that player 1 always finds the prize.
3.4 Implications for Innovation Contests
Consider the setup of an innovation contest, in which a contest designer, who wishes to
maximize the social payoff, might influence the private payoffs of players by offering a
monetary bonus to the prize’s finder, which is added to the inherent reward. Kleinberg
& Oren (2011) characterize the optimal bonuses in a model of such a contest without
private information (additional differences are that in their model each player searches
once, search is costless, and each player has a positive probability of failing to find the
prize when searching in the prize’s location). The following fact plays an important
part in their analysis (Kleinberg & Oren, 2011, Claim 2.2): the socially optimal
strategy profile is obtained by a simple greedy algorithm, according to which players
are assigned to locations one at a time in an arbitrary order, and in each iteration the
player is assigned to the location with the greatest expected social value. By contrast,
the example illustrated in Figure 2 demonstrates that a greedy algorithm may not
yield the socially optimal profile in our setup with asymmetric information, because
the above-mentioned greedy algorithm that starts with Player 1 may assign Player 1
to search in location ω2, and thus it may lead to the suboptimal profile in which no
player searches in location ω3. The failure of the greedy algorithm suggests that the
analysis of the current setup may substantially differ from Kleinberg & Oren (2011).
In what follows we sketch a few implications of Theorem 1 in a contest with
asymmetric information, while leaving the interesting question of characterizing the
optimal bonuses in this setup to future research.
Observe first that if the private payoffs satisfy consistency and solitary-search
dominance, then Theorem 1 implies that the designer can maximize the social payoff
without offering any bonus: the designer is only required to be able to give nonenforced
recommendations to the players (which allows him to induce the play of the socially
optimal Nash equilibrium, rather than other equilibria). In what follows we consider
the case in which solitary-search dominance is violated in the search game (without
additional monetary bonuses).
Consider first a setup in which the contest designer can only offer a constant bonus,
which is independent of the prize’s location. A constant bonus can help to increase the
relative expected private value of locations with a high prior probability. As a result, it
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can help obtain the optimal social payoff, when the reason for not having the required
properties without the designer’s intervention is a low-prior location having a too-high
private value. For example, consider a search game with costless search (i.e., c≡ 0),
where there are two locations ω,ω′ in the same cell of player i with priors µ(ω) = 0.1
and µ(ω′) = 0.2 and with private values of v1i (ω) = 5 and v1i (ω′) = 1, and vmi ≡ 1mv1i .
The too-high private value of location ω violates solitary-search dominance because
the expected private value in ω (0.5 = 0.1 ·5) is more than twice the expected private
value in ω′ (0.2 · 1). A constant bonus of 1 would restore solitary-search dominance
(making the expected private value of ω and ω′ to be equal to 0.6 = 0.1 · (5 + 1) and
0.4 = 0.2 · (1 + 1), respectively).
When the designer can offer a location-dependent and player-dependent bonus, it
allows him to obtain solitary-search dominance and consistency when faced with any
profile of rewards. An interesting open question is how the designer can maximize
the social payoff, while minimizing the expected bonus. For example, assume that
the payoffs are consistent, but they are not solitary-search dominant. Theorem 1
suggests that the designer should boost locations that have lower expected private
values (which violate solitary-search dominance). Note that these locations might
not coincide with the locations that are not searched by any player in the inefficient
equilibrium. This is demonstrated in Example 4.
Example 4. Consider the following search game with common values (as illustrated
in Figure 3):
(
N = {1,2} ,Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4} ,Π,µ,K ≡ 1, c≡ 0,vmi ≡ 1m ,vs ≡ 1
)
, where
Figure 3: Illustration of Example 4: Impact of Monetary Bonuses on the Social Payoff
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the prior is µ(ω1) = 44%, µ(ω2) = 21%, µ(ω3) = 20% and µ(ω4) = 15%, player 1
observes whether the prize’s location is 1 or not, i.e., Π1 = {{ω1} ,{ω2,ω3,ω4}},
and player 2 observes whether the prize’s location is at most 2 or not, i.e., Π2 =
{{ω1,ω2} ,{ω3,ω4}}. The game admits a unique equilibrium, in which player 1
searches in ω1 and ω2, while player 2 searches in locations ω1 and ω3. This equilib-
rium yields an expected social payoff of 0.85 because no player searches in ω4. Note
that solitary-search dominance is violated because of the low probability of location
ω2 (rather than a low probability of ω4).
If the designer can offer a bonus of 0.05 that increases the private value in location
ω2 by 5% to 1.05 (which requires a modest expected bonus of 21% ·0.05≈ 0.01), then
the modified rewards satisfy solitary-search dominance, and, as a result, the game
admits a socially optimal equilibrium with a social payoff of 1 (in which player 1
searches in locations ω1 and ω4, while player 2 searches in locations ω2 and ω3).
4 Feasible Outcomes and Socially Optimal Payoff
In this section we characterize the socially optimal payoff. Note that by Theorem 1,
the socially optimal payoff achieved in every result or example of this section is also
yielded by some equilibrium of the game, if the payoffs are consistent and solitary-
search dominant.
To study the socially optimal payoff, we study a slightly broader question: which
social outcomes are feasible (where a social outcome is a specification of the locations
in which the prize will be found by anyone)? We show that a social outcome is feasible
iff it satisfies a condition that is formed in the spirit of Hall’s marriage theorem and
is an expression of the outcome’s compatibility with the information structure. In
particular, the socially optimal payoff of the game equals the maximal social payoff
of such outcomes.
Pure outcomes A pure outcome is a function f : Ω→ {0,1} that specifies, for
every location, whether that location is being searched (by anyone) or not. A pure
outcome f is feasible if there exists a strategy profile s ∈ S that induces f , i.e., if
f (ω) = 1{ms(ω)>0}. Let fs denote the outcome induced by strategy profile s ∈ S. We
may think of an outcome as a possible goal set by society. In a more abstract model
than ours, in which society does not maintain exact values but still has (perhaps
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incomplete) preferences over various outcomes, a social planner would like to know
which outcomes are feasible.
We say that a pure outcome is compatible with the information structure if the
number of locations being searched within any subset of locations does not exceed
the sum of players’ capacities over all cells that intersect that subset. Formally:
Definition 5. Fix a search game G. A pure outcome f is compatible with the
information structure (abbr., compatible) if for each subset W ⊆ Ω, the following
inequality holds: ∑
ω∈W
f (ω)≤∑
i∈N
Ki ·
∑
pii∈Πi
1pii∩W 6=∅ . (3)
Compatibility is clearly necessary for an outcome to be feasible in a setup in which
players cannot share their information, and each player decides where to search as a
function of her own signal. In such a setup, each player i has ∑pii∈Πi 1pii∩W 6=∅ cells
that intersect the setW , and thus she cannot search in more than Ki ·∑pii∈Πi 1pii∩W 6=∅
locations within W . This implies that all players combined cannot search in more
than ∑i∈NKi ·∑pii∈Πi 1pii∩W 6=∅ locations within W . By representing the setup as a
bipartite graph and applying Hall’s marriage theorem (Hall, 1935), it follows that
compatibility is also a sufficient condition for feasibility.
Proposition 2. A pure outcome f in a search game is feasible iff it is compatible.
Sketch of proof; formal proof is omitted because it is implied by Theorem 2. For sim-
plicity, assume that each player has a capacity of one. Consider a bipartite undirected
graph in which the left side of the graph includes the players’ cells in the search game,
and the right side includes the locations for which f is equal to one (as illustrated in
Figure 4). The graph’s edges connect each cell to the locations that are contained in
that cell. A matching of all locations in this graph, i.e., a set of disjoint edges (namely,
no node appears twice) such that every location belongs to some edge, corresponds to
a strategy profile that induces f . Hall’s theorem states that such a matching exists
iff for any subset of locations W , the number of its neighbors |N (W )| is at least
|W |. The neighbors of W in this graph are the cells that intersect W ; therefore, this
condition is equivalent to f being compatible.
The following example and corollary apply Proposition 2 to obtain a simple suf-
ficient condition for the existence of exhaustive strategy profiles, in terms of the size
of the largest cell of each player.
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Figure 4: Illustration of Proposition 2. The LHS of the figure demonstrates the
information partitions in a two-player search game (with capacities equal to 1). The
RHS translates this into a bipartite graph, where its left part (“men”) includes the
cells of all players, and its right part (“women”) includes all locations ω satisfying
f (ω) = 1. The figure further shows an example of a subset of locations W and the
corresponding set of its neighbors - N (W ) .
Example 5. Suppose that there are three players, each has capacity Ki = 1, and
every cell of every player contains exactly three locations. Consider the pure outcome
f (ω) = 1 for every ω. To see that f is compatible, letW ⊂Ω be a subset of locations.
The number of cells pii of player i that intersect W is at least |W |3 , because the size of
every cell is 3. Therefore,
∑
i∈N
∑
pii∈Πi
1pii∩W 6=∅ ≥ 3 ·
|W |
3 = |W |=
∑
ω∈W
f (ω) ,
i.e., f is compatible. By Proposition 2, f is feasible, i.e., this game admits an exhaus-
tive strategy profile, and the socially optimal payoff equals ∑ω∈Ωµs (ω) ·vs (ω).
More generally, the argument in Example 5 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let G be a search game, and let Mi = max(|pii| : pii ∈ Πi) be the size of
the largest cell of player i. If ∑i∈N Ki/Mi ≥ 1 then G admits an exhaustive strategy
profile.
Mixed outcomes A mixed outcome is a function f : Ω→ [0,1] that assigns a prob-
ability to each location. We interpret f (ω) as the probability that the prize is found,
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conditional on the prize’s location being ω. A mixed outcome may be a goal set by
society, perhaps involving such considerations as fairness, equal opportunity, etc.
A correlated strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(S) is a lottery over the set of pure strategy
profiles. A mixed outcome is feasible if it can be induced by a correlated strategy
profile. That is, f : Ω→ [0,1] is feasible if there exists a correlated strategy profile
σ ∈∆(S) such that
f (ω) =
∑
s∈S
σ (s) ·fs (ω) =
∑
s∈S
σ (s) ·1{ms(ω)>0}.
Let fσ denote the mixed outcome induced by correlated strategy profile σ ∈∆(S).
A mixed outcome is compatible with the information structure if the sum of the
probabilities of finding the prize (henceforth, finding probabilities) of any subset of
locations does not exceed the sum of players’ capacities over all cells that intersect
that subset. Formally:
Definition 6. Fix a search game G. A mixed outcome f is compatible with the
information structure (abbr., compatible) if for each subset of locations W ⊆ Ω, the
following inequality holds:
∑
ω∈W
f (ω)≤∑
i∈N
Ki ·
∑
pii∈Πi
1pii∩W 6=∅ . (4)
Let FC be the set of compatible mixed outcomes. Clearly, compatibility is neces-
sary for a mixed outcome to be feasible, because any feasible mixed outcome lies in
the convex hull of feasible pure outcomes, all of which satisfy compatibility. In what
follows we show that the converse is also true, i.e., that compatibility is sufficient for
a mixed outcome to be feasible.
Theorem 2. A mixed outcome f in a search game is feasible iff it is compatible.
Note that we cannot directly use Hall’s theorem for this result, due to the outcome
being mixed, rather than pure (as Hall’s theorem applies only to a “binary” matching
of zeros and ones). Instead, the proof (presented in Section 4.1) includes two parts: (1)
we introduce the notion of coordinated-search profiles, and apply (Prop. 3) the max-
flow min-cut theorem to show that any compatible mixed outcome can be induced by
a coordinated-search profile, and (2) we apply (Prop. 4) the Birkhoff–von Neumann
theorem to show that coordinated-search profiles induce feasible mixed outcomes.
21
Before presenting the next example, we define a strategy profile s as redundancy-
free if (1) every player always uses her entire capacity (i.e., |si (pii)|=Ki for every cell
pii of every player i), and (2) there is no search duplication (i.e., ms (ω)≤ 1 for every
ω ∈Ω). Since a player can search in no more than Ki · |Πi| locations, a strategy profile
is redundancy-free iff the number of locations being searched equals ∑i∈NKi |Πi|. If
a game admits redundancy-free strategy profiles, then they are exactly the location-
maximizing profiles.
The following example and corollary apply Theorem 2 to obtain a simple sufficient
condition for the existence of redundancy-free strategy profiles, in terms of the size
of the smallest cell of each player.
Example 6. Suppose that there are three players, each has capacity Ki = 1, and
every cell of every player contains exactly five locations. Consider the mixed outcome
f (ω) = 0.6 for every ω, and let W ⊂ Ω be a subset of locations. The number of cells
pii of player i that intersect W is at least |W |5 ; therefore,
∑
i∈N
∑
pii∈Πi
1pii∩W 6=∅ ≥ 3 ·
|W |
5 = 0.6 · |W |=
∑
ω∈W
f (ω) ,
i.e., f is compatible. By Theorem 2, f can be induced by a correlated strategy
profile. Since ∑ω∈Ω f (ω) = 0.6 · |Ω|=∑i∈NKi |Πi|, this implies that the game admits
a redundancy-free strategy profile.
More generally, the argument in Example 6 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Let G be a search game, and let mi = min(|pii| : pii ∈ Πi) be the size the
smallest cell of player i. If ∑i∈N Ki/mi ≤ 1 then G admits a redundancy-free profile.
If a correlated strategy σ achieves some level of social payoff, then at least one of
the pure strategies in the support of σ yields at least that much. Therefore, Theo-
rem 2 implies a characterization of the socially optimal payoff of search games: the
socially optimal payoff is the highest payoff induced by a compatible mixed outcome.
Formally:
Corollary 5. Let G be a search game. Then Uopt = maxf∈FC
∑
ω∈Ω f (ω)µ(ω)vs (ω) .
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4.1 Coordinated Search
In this subsection we consider a variant of our model, and show that it does not
increase the socially optimal payoff. The analysis turns out to be closely related to
Theorem 2, and is helpful in deriving its proof.
The setup Coordinated search allows players to coordinate partial search efforts
within a location. Specifically, we now allow each player to divide fractions of her
search capacity among the different locations. This is formalized as follows. Fix a
search game G. For any k ∈N and any cell pi, let D (pi,k) denote the set of all functions
η : pi→ [0,1] that satisfy ∑ω∈pi η (ω)≤ k. That is, an element of D (pi,k) is a function
that assigns a search effort to each location in pi such that the total effort is at most k.
A coordinated-search profile is a tuple τ = (τ1, ..., τn), where each function τi assigns
to each cell pii ∈Πi an element of D (pii,Ki). We interpret τi (pii,ω)≡ τi (pii)(ω) as the
(fractional) search effort player i exerts in location ω ∈ pii (when the player observes
the signal pii). Let T be the set of all coordinated-search profiles. Observe that any
(pure) strategy profile in G is a coordinated-search profile (i.e., S ⊆ T , where an
element of D (pi,k) that assigns only search efforts of zeros and ones is identified with
the corresponding subset of pi with at most k elements).
Importantly, we assume that fractional search efforts of different players are summed
optimally from society’s point of view. For example, if player i exerts an effort of 50%
in location ω in cell pii (ω) and player j exerts an effort of 40% in location ω in cell
pij (ω), then the prize is found with a total probability of 90%, conditional on the
location being9 ω.
Thus, any coordinated-search profile induces a mixed outcome, where the finding
probability assigned to each location ω is the sum of the fractional search efforts
exerted by each player i in location ω in cell pii (ω) (bounded by the maximal finding
probability of one). Formally, the mixed outcome fτ induced by the coordinated-
search profile τ is defined by fτ (ω) = min(
∑
i∈N τi (pii (ω) ,ω) ,1) . Hence, the social
9This probability is strictly higher than if it were a mixed strategy profile, where with positive
probability (20% = 40% ·50%) there would be search duplication (where both players search in ω),
and the total probability of finding the prize, conditional on the location being ω, would be strictly
less than 90%.
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payoff U c (τ) induced by a coordinated-search profile τ is
U c (τ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
min
∑
i∈N
τi (pii (ω) ,ω) ,1
 ·µ(ω) ·vs (ω) .
First, we observe that any coordinated-search profile induces a compatible mixed
outcome.
Claim 1. Fix search game G and τ ∈ T . Then fτ is a compatible mixed outcome.
Proof. Fix a subset of locations W ⊆ Ω. Then the following inequality holds (where
the last inequality is implied by ∑ω∈pii τi (pii,ω)≤Ki):
∑
ω∈W
fτ (ω) =
∑
ω∈W
min
(∑
i
τi (pii (ω) ,ω) ,1
)
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈W
τi (pii (ω) ,ω)≤
∑
i∈N
Ki
∑
pii∈Πi
1pii∩W 6=∅.
Next we employ the max-flow min-cut theorem to show that the converse is true as
well: any compatible mixed outcome can be induced by a coordinated-search profile.
Proposition 3. Fix a search game G and a compatible mixed outcome f . Then there
exists a coordinated-search profile τ that induces f (i.e., f = fτ ).
Sketch of proof; formal proof in Appendix B.2. We construct a flow network: a di-
rected graph whose edges have flow capacities. The graph connects every cell to the
locations contained in it, with infinite flow capacity (as illustrated in Figure 5). We
add a source vertex that connects to every cell, with flow capacity Ki, and a sink
vertex to which every location ω is connected, with flow capacity f(ω). A cut is a
subset of edges without which there exists no path from the source to the sink. The
compatibility of f implies that the minimal cut has a total capacity of ∑ω∈Ω f (ω) .
Therefore, by the max-flow min-cut theorem (Ford & Fulkerson, 1956; see a textbook
presentation in Cormen et al., 2009, p. 723, Thm. 26.6), the network admits a flow
of ∑ω∈Ω f (ω) . We define τ by letting τi (pii,ω) equal the flow from pii to ω.
Coordination does not add new outcomes The social payoff is constrained by
the fact that the players are not allowed to share their private signals. This constraint
is captured by the compatibility condition presented above. The inability, in our main
model (as opposed to the coordinated-search variant), to efficiently coordinate players’
fractional search efforts within a location is another potential constraint on the social
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Figure 5: Illustration of Proposition 3. The left side of the figure demonstrates
partitions in a two-player search game. The right side demonstrates the constructed
directed graph in which (1) a source node is linked to every player’s cells by an edge
with the player’s capacity, and (2) each cell is linked by unlimited edges to all the
locations within that cell, and (3) each location ω is linked to a sink node by an edge
with capacity f (ω). The gray X-s demonstrate an example of a cut, i.e., a subset of
edges whose removal from the graph disconnects the source from the sink.
payoff. Nevertheless, in what follows we show that this constraint does not limit the
social payoff. Specifically, we apply the Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem (Birkhoff,
1946; Von Neumann, 1953; see Berman & Plemmons, 1994, p. 50, for a textbook
presentation) to show that any mixed outcome that can be induced by a coordinated-
search profile is feasible (i.e., it can be induced by a correlated strategy profile with
no coordination of fractional efforts).
Proposition 4. Fix search game G and a coordinated-search profile τ ∈ T . Then
there exists a correlated strategy profile σ ∈∆(S) such that fτ = fσ.
Sketch of proof (see Appendix B.3 for the formal proof). To simplify the sketch of the
proof assume that all capacities are equal to one. Let τ be a coordinated-search profile.
We can represent the profile τ as a matrix (Aτpiω)ω∈Ω,pi is a cell , where
Aτpiω =
τi (pi,ω) ω ∈ pi, pi ∈ Πi0 elsewhere .
Observe that Aτpiω is a nonnegative matrix, and that the sum of each row pi is at most
one. Let Bτpiω be a matrix derived from Aτpiω by decreasing elements of the matrix
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such that the sum of each column ω that exceeded one in Aτpiω is equal to one in Bτpiω.
Observe that Bτpiω is a doubly substochastic matrix; i.e., it is a nonnegative matrix for
which the sum of each column and each row is at most one. A simple adaptation of
the Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem shows that Bτpiω can be represented as a convex
combination of matrices C1piω, ...,CKpiω (i.e., Bτpiω =
∑
wk ·Ckpiω where
∑
wk = 1 and
wk ≥ 0), where each matrix Ckpiω: (1) contains only zeros and ones, and (2) contains
in each row and in each column at most a single value of one. Observe that each such
matrix Ckpiω corresponds to a pure profile sk in the search game, and that the outcome
fτ is a weighted sum of the outcomes induced by the profiles sk. This implies that fτ
is feasible because it is induced by the correlated strategy profile σ =∑wk · sk.
In the following example, Proposition 4 is used to prove that the game admits an
exhaustive strategy profile.
Example 7. Let the set of locations Ω =A ·∪B1 ·∪B2 ·∪B3 be a union of four disjoint
sets of equal size. There are three players, each with capacity Ki = 1. The partition
Πi of player i consists of cells of size two {a,b}, where a ∈ A and b ∈ Bi, and of
cells of size six, whose members come from Bj ∪Bk (j,k 6= i). The partitions are
illustrated in Figure 6. Define a coordinated-search profile τ as follows. For pii =
{a,b}, τi(pii,a) = 1/3 and τi(pii, b) = 2/3, and for pii of size six, τi assigns 1/6 to every
location in pii. Thus, for any a ∈ A, ∑i∈N τi (pii (a) ,a) = 1/3 + 1/3 + 1/3 = 1, for any
b1 ∈B1, ∑i∈N τi (pii (b1) , b1) = 2/3+1/6+1/6 = 1, and similarly for B2 and B3; therefore,
fτ (ω) = 1 for every ω ∈Ω. Proposition 4 implies that the game admits an exhaustive
strategy profile.
Figure 6: Illustration of Example 7 with |Ω| = 12 locations. The figure shows the
players’ partitions (where the cell containing the remaining six locations of each player
is not drawn to make the figure less crowded).
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Note that |Πi| = |Ω|/3, implying that |Ω| = ∑i∈NKi |Πi|; therefore, a strategy
profile in this game is exhaustive iff it is redundancy-free. Redundancy-freeness can,
alternatively, be deduced from the fact that under τ players always use their entire
capacity and the sum of fractional search efforts ∑i∈N τi (pii (ω) ,ω) does not exceed
one in any location ω.
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 jointly imply Theorem 2. Moreover, Proposition
4 implies that if some level of social payoff is yielded by a coordinated-search profile,
then the same or higher social payoff can be yielded by a pure strategy profile. That is,
the ability to coordinate search efforts does not improve the social payoff. Formally:
Corollary 6. Fix a search game G and a coordinated-search profile τ ∈ T . Then,
there exists a pure strategy profile s ∈ S such that U (s)≥ U c (τ).
Proof. Proposition 4 implies that fτ =
∑
wk ·fsk , where
∑
wk = 1, wk ≥ 0, and sk ∈ S
for each k. This implies that U c (τ) = ∑wk ·U (sk), which, in turn, implies that
U c (τ)≤ U (sk) for some k.
In Appendix A we apply our results to search games in which the intersection of
every profile of cells includes at least κ locations, and derive tight conditions for the
existence of equilibria with appealing properties.
5 General Signals
In this section we present a general model of signals, dropping the assumption that
every location corresponds to a single state of the world. We also discuss a weaker
assumption, under which all our results still hold.
5.1 Adaptations to the Model
To extend our model to the general case, we let the set of locations and the set of states
be different objects. Let Ω denote the set of states of the world (abbr., states). A
state determines the location of the prize, and we let `(ω) denote the prize’s location
when the state of the world is ω. Thus, the different locations induce a partition of Ω,
and without loss of generality we let L, the set of locations, be that partition. That
is, a location ` ∈ L is an element of the partition, namely, a subset of states such that
`(ω) is the same for every ω in the subset.
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A generalized search game is a tuple G˜ = (N,Ω,Π,µ,L,K,c,v), where L is the
partition of locations. All other components are as defined in the baseline model. To
prevent confusion we use the term simple search game to refer to the search games
of the baseline model. For a cell pii ∈ Πi, let `(pii) be the set of locations that are
consistent with the state being in pii, i.e., `(pii) = {`(ω) |ω ∈ pii}.
A strategy of player i is a function si that assigns to each cell pii a subset of locations
with at most Ki elements that satisfies si (pii)⊆ `(pii). We interpret si (pii) as the set
of up to Ki locations in which the player searches when she observes the signal pii.
When the state of the world is ω, player i finds the prize if she searches in the location
`(ω), i.e., if `(ω) ∈ si (pii (ω)). We redefine the number of players who search in the
prize’s location when the state is ω as follows: ms (ω) =
∑
i∈N 1`(ω)∈si(pii(ω)).
A player’s payoff, conditional on the state being ω, is then redefined by
ui (s|ω) = 1`(ω)∈si(pii(ω))v
ms(ω)
i (ω)− ci (|si (pii (ω))|) .
Consistency is redefined as follows. A search game has consistent payoffs if for
any two locations ` and `′, if the expected (interim) private value of player i is strictly
lower in ` than in `′, then the expected (interim) social value is weakly lower in `.
Definition 7. Generalized Search game G˜ has consistent payoffs if for any player i,
any cell pii ∈ Πi, and any two locations `,`′ ∈ L, the following implication holds:
∑
ω∈`∩pii
µ(ω) ·v1i (ω)<
∑
ω′∈`′∩pii
µ
(
ω′
)
·v1i
(
ω′
)
⇒
∑
ω∈`∩pii
µ(ω) ·vs (ω)≤
∑
ω′∈`′∩pii
µ
(
ω′
)
·vs
(
ω′
)
.
Similarly, solitary-search dominance is redefined as follows.
Definition 8. Generalized search game G˜ has solitary-search dominant payoffs if
for any player i, cell pii ∈ Πi, and pair of locations `,`′ ∈ L such that `∩pii 6= ∅, the
following inequalities hold:
∑
ω∈`∩pii
µ(ω|pii) ·v1i (ω)≥
∑
ω′∈`′∩pii
µ
(
ω′|pii
)
·v2i
(
ω′
)
, and
∑
ω∈`∩pii
µ(ω|pii) ·v1i (ω)≥ ci (Ki)− ci (Ki−1) .
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All other parts of the baseline model remain the same.
5.2 Equivalence Result with Weakly Deterministic Signals
Our results about simple search games hold in the current setup if we assume that
the signal of any player is determined by the prize’s location and the signal of another
player. Formally:
Definition 9. Generalized search game G˜ has weakly deterministic signals if `(ω) =
`(ω′) and pii (ω) = pii (ω′)⇒ pij (ω) = pij (ω′), for any ω,ω′ ∈ Ω and players i, j.
In words, if two states ω,ω′ share the same location and are indistinguishable to
one of the players, then these states must be indistinguishable to all players.
The set of generalized search games with weakly deterministic signals is broader
than the set of simple search games. In particular: (1) generalized search games
allow a player to hold different positive posterior beliefs on the prize being in location
` depending on the different signals that she may observe (which is impossible in
simple search games), and (2) any generalized search game in which players have
the same information partitions (i.e., Πi = Πj for any pair of players) has weakly
deterministic signals. Nevertheless, we show that any generalized search game with
weakly deterministic signals is strategically equivalent to a simple game (and, thus,
our results hold for the broader set of games).
A generalized search game is equivalent to a simple search game if there exists
a bijection between the sets of strategies of each game that preserves the expected
payoff of all players.
Definition 10. Simple search game G and generalized search game G˜ with the same
set of players and the same capacities are equivalent if there exist bijections fi :
Si
(
G˜
)
→ Si (G), such that u˜i (s˜) = ui (f (s˜)) and U˜ (s˜) = U (f (s˜)) for every strategy
profile s˜ ∈ S
(
G˜
)
and every player i (where f = (f1,, . . . ,fn)).
It is immediate that equivalent games have equivalent sets of Nash equilibria;
i.e., s˜ is a Nash equilibrium of G˜ iff f (s˜) is a Nash equilibrium of G, and both
equilibria yield the same payoffs to all players and to society. Next we show that any
generalized search game with weakly deterministic signals is equivalent to a simple
game. Formally:
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Claim 2. Let G˜ be a generalized search game with weakly deterministic signals. Then
there exists an equivalent simple search game G. Moreover, if G˜ is consistent or
solitary-search dominant, then so is G.
Sketch of proof; formal proof is omitted for brevity. We say that two states in G˜ are
equivalent if they have the same location and no player can distinguish between the
two states (i.e., the states are elements of the same cell, for any player). We con-
struct the equivalent simple game G by the following two steps: (1) merge equivalent
states into a single state, and (2) extend the set of locations, such that each location
corresponds to a single (possibly merged) state. The reward in each merged state is
defined as the weighted average of the rewards in the corresponding equivalent states.
The prior of each merged state is defined as the sum of the priors of the corresponding
states. The equivalence of the two games, and the invariance of the consistency and
solitary-search dominance of the payoffs, are straightforward. The simple process of
constructing the equivalent simple game is demonstrated in Figure 7.
5.3 Non-monotone Value of Information
Refining the players’ partitions always weakly increases the socially optimal payoff.
Therefore, if a refinement maintains the properties of weakly deterministic signals,
consistency, and solitary-search dominance, then the maximal social payoff yielded
by an equilibrium also increases, by Theorem 1 and Claim 2. However, even if we
restrict ourselves to games with weakly deterministic signals, a refinement may still
break consistency or solitary-search dominance (by contrast, this cannot happen in
simple search games). Consequently, the value of information may be negative, in the
sense that the refinement decreases the equilibrium social payoff.
The following example exhibits a refinement with a negative value, and a further
refinement with a positive one. More specifically, it presents a game that admits an
exhaustive equilibrium if the players’ signal is either uninformative or fully informa-
tive, but not if it is partially informative.
Example 8. Let (N = {1,2} ,Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4} ,Π,µ,L= {{ω1,ω2} ,{ω3,ω4}} ,K ≡
1, c ≡ 0,vmi ≡ 1m ,vs ≡ 1) be a generalized search game, where states `12 ≡ {ω1,ω2}
comprise one location, and states `34 = {ω3,ω4} comprise another location. The prior
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Figure 7: Illustration of Claim 2. The upper panel presents a generalized two-
player search game G˜ with weakly deterministic signals. The lower panel describes
the equivalent simple game G in which (1) states ω2b and ω2c are merged to ω2bc, and
(2) each location has been divided into singletons.
belief µ is: µ(ω1) = µ(ω3) = 0.5− and µ(ω2) = µ(ω4) = , and assume that  is small,
say = 10%, as illustrated in Figure 8.
With the trivial partitions (Π ≡ {Ω}), all (pure) Nash equilibria are exhaustive
(the prize is always found), and are characterized by one player searching in location
`12 and the other player searching in location `34. Similarly, with the full-information
partitions (Π≡{{ω1} ,{ω2} ,{ω3} ,{ω4}}), each player knows the prize’s location, and
the unique equilibrium is exhaustive (each player searches in the true prize’s location).
Finally, consider the case of symmetric partially-informative signals induced by the
symmetric partitions Π ≡ {{ω1,ω4} ,{ω2,ω3}} . Observe that in this case (in which
solitary-search dominance is violated) the unique equilibrium is both players searching
in `34 (resp., `12) after observing the signal {ω2,ω3} (resp., {ω1,ω4}), and, therefore,
the prize is not found when the state of the world is either ω2 or ω4.
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Figure 8: Illustration of Example 8. Non-monotone value of information in a
symmetric two-player generalized search game.
5.4 Counterexamples without Weakly Deterministic Signals
Figure 9 demonstrates a failure of each of our main results without the assumption
of weakly deterministic signals: the left panel demonstrates the failure of Theorem 1,
and the right panel demonstrates the failure of Prop. 4 (and thus of Theorem 2).
6 Conclusion
Our paper studies search games in which agents explore different routes to making a
discovery that would benefit both society and the discoverer (although the private gain
may differ from the social gain). Our main departure from the related literature is that
we introduce asymmetric information to this setup. That is, we allow each agent to
have private information about the plausibility of different routes, while almost all of
the existing literature assumes that all agents have the same information. We believe
that this is a natural development, as asymmetric information is a key component
in many real-life decentralized research situations. In addition, we allow substantial
heterogeneity between the different routes (i.e., different expected values of finding
the prize in different locations), while most papers assume that all routes are ex-ante
identical (see, e.g., Matros & Smirnov, 2016; Matros et al., 2019). We also allow
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Figure 9: The left panel presents a counterexample to Theorem 1 (without
weakly deterministic signals). It shows the essentially unique suboptimal equilibrium
and the non-Nash socially optimal profile in a generalized two-player search game
with consistent and solitary-search dominant payoffs, K ≡ 1, c≡ 0, vmi ≡ 1m , vs ≡ 1.
The right panel presents a counterexample to Proposition 4. It shows a
three-player generalized search game with K ≡ 1 in which coordinated search allows
the players to always find the prize, whereas this is not possible without coordination.
Each player’s partition has two cells: one with 4 states (which is drawn in the figure),
and another with the remaining 5 states (which is not drawn, to make the figure less
crowded). The figure shows a coordinated-search profile that always finds the prize:
each player i divides her search effort equally between locations `123 and `456 in her
four-state cell, and exerts all of her effort to location {ωi+6} in the other cell. By
contrast, in any pure strategy profile in which ω7, ω8, and ω9 are all searched by some
player, either `123 or `456 is not searched by any player in at least one state.
heterogeneity in the rewards and costs of different players.
Our model is simplified in one aspect, as we assume that the search is a one-shot
game, while the dynamic aspects of the search interaction are a key component in
many of the existing models (see, e.g., Chatterjee & Evans, 2004; Akcigit & Liu,
2015; Bryan & Lemus, 2017). While a one-shot game might model reasonably well
situations with severe time constraints, such as the motivating example of developing
a COVID-19 vaccine as soon as possible, we think that incorporating asymmetric
information in a dynamic search game is an important avenue for future research.
Our first main result (Theorem 1) states that a search game admits a (pure)
equilibrium that yields the first-best social payoff if for any two locations within a
player’s cell: (1) the player and society have the same ordinal ranking over these
two locations (consistency), and (2) the player always prefers searching in one of
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these locations alone to searching in the other location with other players, or to
not searching at all (solitary-search dominance). Taylor (1995); Fullerton & McAfee
(1999); Che & Gale (2003); Koh (2017) present setups of innovation contests in which
it is socially optimal to restrict the number of participating players, because adding a
player decreases the incentive of others to exert costly effort. By contrast, Theorem
1 implies that adding players to a search game with consistent and solitary-search
dominant payoffs always improves the maximal social payoff that can be yielded by
an equilibrium. This is so because the first-best social payoff is (weakly) increasing
when players are added. Thus, when the payoffs are consistent and solitary-search
dominant, it is socially optimal to allow all players to participate. It is an open
question whether this property holds in our setup when we relax the assumptions of
consistency and solitary-search dominance.
Our second main result shows that the first-best payoff is constrained only by
compatibility with the information structure. Any outcome in which the number of
locations being searched within any subset of locations does not exceed the sum of
players’ capacities over all cells that intersect that subset, can be induced by a mixture
of pure strategy profiles. A surprising implication of this result is that an alternative
setup, in which players can coordinate fractional search efforts within a location, does
not increase the social payoff.
Appendix
A Application: Games with Intersecting Signals
We say that a search game has κ-intersecting signals if the intersection of any profile
of cells (one for each player) includes at least κ locations. Formally:
Definition 11. Search game G has κ-intersecting signals if for any profile of cells
(pi1, ..,pin) ∈ Π1× ...×Πn there are at least κ different locations in pi1∩ ...∩pin.
Therefore, κ-intersecting signals have the property that each signal of player i
has a positive probability conditional on any profile of signals observed by the other
players. Observe that having 1-intersecting signals is substantially weaker than having
independent signals (i.e., than requiring that the probability that player i observes
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a signal is independent of the signals observed by others). The assumption of κ-
intersecting signals seems plausible (especially for κ = 1) in situations like Example
1, if each research lab has a unique expertise that is, in some sense, separate from all
the information that can be obtained by the other labs.
Our final result states that search games with κ-intersecting signals and capaci-
ties of at most κ have appealing efficiency properties. Namely, such games admit a
redundancy-free strategy profile iff ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|, and they admit an exhaustive
strategy profile iff ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| ≥ |Ω|. Moreover, this strategy profile is an equilib-
rium if the payoffs are solitary-search dominant. Formally:
Proposition 5. Let G be a search game with capacity Ki ≤ κ for every player i ∈N
and with κ-intersecting signals (resp., and with solitary-search dominant payoffs).
Then G admits
1. a redundancy-free strategy profile (resp., equilibrium) iff ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|;
2. an exhaustive strategy profile (resp., equilibrium) iff ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| ≥ |Ω|.
Sketch of proof; see Appendix B.4 for the formal proof. Let M be the set of players
whose partitions are not trivial. Consider a smaller auxiliary search game created by
omitting all players in N \M . Since the signals are κ-intersecting, each cell of each
player must contain at least κ ·2|M |−1 locations. Since this number is at least κ · |M |,
Corollary 4 implies that the smaller game admits a redundancy-free strategy profile.
If ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|, then we can let the remaining players (with trivial partitions)
choose one by one a location that has not been chosen by other players yet. The
resulting strategy profile is redundancy-free in G. If ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| ≥ |Ω|, then there
are sufficiently many remaining players (with trivial partitions) to cover all locations,
and hence the resulting strategy profile is exhaustive.
B Formal Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Search Games areWeakly Acyclic)
Given a strategy profile s, we define, for any cell pii ∈ Πi of player i, the payoff
of pii as the (interim) expected payoff of player i given that her signal is pii, i.e.,
ui (s|pii) = ∑ω∈pii µ(ω|pii)ui (s|ω). Note that player i is best-responding iff every cell
of hers is best-responding.
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Player i has Ki units of capacity, which we index by numbers between 1 and Ki. A
cell-unit of player i is a pair (pii, j) where pii ∈Πi is a cell, and 1≤ j≤Ki is a unit index.
We can assume w.l.o.g. that a strategy specifies not only in which locations within
pii to search, but also which specific cell-unit is assigned to each of these locations.
Thus, for every cell-unit α of i, a strategy of i chooses a location or chooses that α
be inactive. We can think of a player as being composed of many “smaller” decision
makers, one for each cell of hers, and of each cell as being composed of even smaller
decision makers, one for every cell-unit of that cell (with the restriction that two cell-
units of the same cell cannot search in the same location). We define the payoff of
cell-unit α = (pii, j) of player i as the payoff of its cell ui (s|pii). Thus, every cell-unit
of pii gets the same payoff. Note that the expected reward of a cell-unit located at
ω is µ(ω|pii) · vms(ω)i (ω), and ui (s|pii) equals the sum of the expected rewards of the
active cell-units of pii minus the cost ci of the number of active cell-units of pii.
Observe that if an inactive cell-unit (pii, j) switches to searching in location ω, it
makes the activation of another cell-unit (pii, j′) at ω′ (weakly) less attractive than it
previously was, because of increasing marginal costs (namely, the convexity of costs).
Similarly, deactivating a cell-unit makes a second deactivation weakly less attractive.
Given a strategy profile s, if there exists a deviation of a single cell-unit that
improves its own payoff then, by definition, it is also an improvement for its cell.
Conversely, let us show that the existence of an improvement for a cell implies the
existence of an improvement for some cell-unit. Suppose first that the cell improve-
ment consists merely of changing the location of a few cell-units, without changing the
number of active units. Then the cost remains unchanged, but the overall expected
reward has increased. Hence, there must be at least one cell-unit α whose expected
reward has increased by switching from its location ω to another location ω′ that was
not chosen by player i under s. Therefore, switching the location of α from ω to ω′
is an improvement for α. Next, suppose that activating multiple cell-units is an im-
provement. Then there must also exist an improvement consisting of activating only
one of these cell-units, due to the above observation about convex costs. Similarly, if
the cell can improve by deactivating multiple cell-units then one of them can improve
by deactivating itself.
Overall, we got that a player is best-responding iff all her cells are best-responding
iff all her cell-units are best-responding.
Lemma 1. Suppose that B is a set of cell-units (of various players), α /∈B is another
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cell-unit, and s1 is a strategy profile under which every member of B is best-responding.
Then there exists a finite sequence of cell-unit improvements s1, . . . , sK such that every
member of B∪{α} is best-responding under sK.
Proof. For convenience of description, let us imagine that all the inactive cell-unit of
all players stay in some place that we denote by λ. The set Ω∪{λ} of the locations
plus λ will be called the set of sites. With this terminology, we can say that a strategy
of player i chooses a site for every cell-unit of i (and λ is the only site where more
than one cell-unit of the same player can be placed).
In what follows, whenever we mention cell-units, it only refers to members of
B∪{α}. Note that the site of all other cell-units will remain fixed along the sequence.
Suppose that α is not best-responding in s1; otherwise we are done. Let α switch
from its current site θ1 to another site θ2 that is a best-response. The new strategy
profile is s2. Now α is best-responding, and we claim that any other cell-unit β of the
same cell is still best-responding. We note first that β is not placed in θ1 (since β was
best-responding under s1), and w.l.o.g. it is also not in θ2 (otherwise, it is currently
best-responding, since α is). Next we note that β cannot improve by switching to θ1;
otherwise, simply switching β to θ2 would have been an improvement earlier, in s1.
Suppose first that θ1 and θ2 are both locations. Then, since θ2 is now occupied,
and the preference relation between sites other than θ1 and θ2 has not changed (as the
cost has not changed), β is indeed still best-responding. Next suppose that θ2 = λ.
Then, by the convex costs observation, the attractiveness of λ has decreased by the
switch from θ1 to θ2 = λ, hence β still cannot improve by switching to λ. And although
the cost has changed, the relation between locations other than θ1 has not changed;
hence, β is best-responding. Finally, suppose that θ1 = λ. Then the relation between
locations other than θ2 has not changed; hence, β is best-responding.
Phase I In s2, we add a dummy player at the site θ1, denoting the resulting strategy
profile by σ2 (for a profile σt that includes the dummy player, st will denote the same
profile without the dummy). Then Phase I begins: at every stage of Phase I, one
cell-unit who is currently not best-responding switches to a best-response site. This
continues as long as there are non-best-responding cell-units, unless someone switches
to θ1, in which case Phase I immediately terminates.
As we will see, Phase I begins by some cell-unit switching from θ2 to another site
θ3, then another cell-unit switching from θ3 to another site, etc. More specifically, we
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claim that under any strategy profile σ = σt encountered during Phase I,
(a) there exists exactly one site θ that is chosen by one more cell-unit than under s1,
i.e., mσ(θ) =ms1(θ)+1, while for every other site θ′, mσ(θ′) =ms1(θ′) (we call θ “the
plus site”); and
(b) for any cell-unit β whose current site is some θ with mσ(θ)> 0, and who can also
choose another site θ′, if there were ms1(θ) cell-units at θ (including β itself) and
ms1(θ′) cell-units at θ′, then β would weakly prefer θ to θ′.
Property (b) roughly says that if β is not best-responding, it is only because β is in
the plus site.
When Phase I starts, in σ2, property (a) holds and α has just switched to the plus
site θ2. Since all cell-units of the cell of α were best-responding in s2 (i.e., without the
dummy) they obey property (b) in σ2 (in particular, α is currently best-responding
when α’s current site is the plus site, let alone when it is not the plus site). As for
cell-units of other cells, they obeyed (b) in s1 and, therefore, they still do, as the
switch of α or the addition of the dummy do not affect that.
The claim is proved by induction from one stage to the next: suppose that cell-unit
β improves on stage t by switching from θ to θ′. Since β could improve, (b) implies
that θ must have been the plus site in stage t. Therefore, the plus will move with β
from θ to θ′, and (a) will still hold in stage t+ 1. Note that, importantly, if the plus
site is λ in some stage then every cell-unit is best-responding, since the number of
partners does not affect the reward in λ, which simply equals 0; hence, Phase I will
end on that stage.
As for property (b), β best-responds in θ′, and other cell-units of β’s cell obeyed
(b) on stage t, implying that they were best-responding on that stage. It follows, by
the same argument we used above for t = 1 (i.e., the transition from s1 to s2), that
they also best-respond on stage t+1. Therefore, they obey (b); and cell-units of other
cells still obey (b), as they were not affected by β’s switch.
To see that Phase I cannot go on forever, recall first that it ends if the plus site is
λ. Otherwise, on each stage of Phase I some cell-unit β switches from location ω to
location ω′, and the costs always remain fixed. Since this switch is an improvement,
it strictly increases the expected reward of β. Now ω′ becomes the plus site, and
afterwards the expected reward of β when placed in ω′ can never be lower than it is
now, while it can be higher if the plus is somewhere else (or if β improves again).10
10One can verify that, in fact, β will not switch again during Phase I. We employ a different
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Thus, the expected reward of β will never go down to the level it was at before the
switch. Hence, Phase I cannot turn into a cycle, and since there are only finitely
many strategy profiles, Phase I must eventually end.
Recall that Phase I terminates once someone switches to θ1. Therefore, the plus
site cannot be θ1 during this phase except maybe at the end, and hence nobody
switches from θ1 during Phase I. Therefore, all the switches are improvements not
only in the game with the dummy added at θ1, but also in the original game.
Denote the strategy profile at the end of Phase I by σ∗. Now we remove the dummy
from θ1. Suppose first that Phase I ended because somebody has just switched to θ1.
Then, the removal of the dummy means that now there is no plus site at all, and (b)
implies that every cell-unit best-responds under s∗ (recall that s∗ is σ∗ without the
dummy player), and we are done.
Phase II Otherwise, Phase I ended at σ∗ because everyone was best-responding
(when the dummy was still at θ1). Starting from s∗, we define Phase II analogously
to Phase I (while Phase I more or less described a process of restabilizing the system
after one cell-unit is added, Phase II describes restabilizing it after one cell-unit is
removed), as follows. At every stage, as long as there are cell-units who are not best-
responding, choose a cell, and choose a switch of a single cell-unit that would yield
the highest increase in that cell’s payoff.
As we will see, Phase II begins by some cell-unit switching to θ1 from some site
θ′, then another cell-unit switching to θ′ from another site, etc. More specifically, we
claim that under any strategy profile s= st encountered during Phase II,
(a’) there exists exactly one site θ with ms(θ) =mσ∗(θ)−1, while for every other site
θ′, ms(θ′) = mˆσ∗(θ′) (we call θ “the minus site”); and
(b’) for any cell-unit β whose current site is some θ and who can also choose site θ′,
if there were mσ∗(θ) cell-units at θ (including β) and mσ∗(θ′) cell-units at θ′, then β
would weakly prefer θ to θ′.
The analysis is almost analogous to that of Phase I. When Phase II starts, in
the profile s∗, (a’) holds and θ1 is the minus site. (b’) also holds because everyone
was best-responding under σ∗. The claim is proved by induction from one stage
to the next: suppose that cell-unit β improves on stage t by switching from θ to
θ′. Improvement implies, by (b’), that θ′ must have been the minus site in stage t.
argument here, in order to strengthen the analogy with Phase II.
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Therefore, the minus will move from θ′ to θ, and (a’) will still hold in stage t+ 1.
Note that if the minus site is λ in some stage, then every cell-unit is best-responding
and Phase II will end on that stage.
Let pii be the cell of β. Any cell-unit of another cell still obeys (b’), as it was not
affected by β’s switch. Since the switch of β from θ to θ′ was, by definition of Phase
II, a best cell-unit switch for pii, β cannot improve again. Therefore, β obeys (b’),
since β is not in the minus site. Let γ be another cell-unit of pii. Note first that γ
cannot improve by switching to the current minus site θ; otherwise, switching γ to θ′
earlier, on stage t, would have been a better switch than the one chosen.
We have seen that θ′ 6= λ. If also θ 6= λ, then the preference relation between sites
other than θ and θ′ has not changed, and, therefore, γ still obeys (b’). Otherwise,
θ = λ. Then if γ is placed in λ it still obeys (b’), because the attractiveness of λ has
increased, by the convex costs observation; and if γ is placed in some location then γ
still obeys (b’), because the relation between locations other than θ′ has not changed.
When Phase II ends, every cell-unit will be best-responding. To see that Phase II
must eventually end, we employ the same argument as in Phase I, noting that right
after some cell-unit β switches to location ω′, ω′ is not the minus site, and, therefore,
the expected reward of β when placed in ω′ can never be lower than it is now.
To prove weak acyclicity, start from any strategy profile. By applying Lemma
1 inductively we obtain a sequence of cell-unit improvements that lead to a profile
under which one cell-unit is best-responding, then two, and so on. Eventually we get
a profile under which every cell-unit is best-responding, hence an equilibrium.
B.2 Proof of Prop. 3 (Any f ∈ FC Can Be Induced by τ ∈ T )
Denote Πˆ = {(i;pii) : i ∈N,pii ∈Πi}. We construct a flow network, namely, a directed
graph D= (V,E) with vertices V and edges E ⊂ V ×V , and a flow capacity κ(v1,v2)≥
0 for every edge (v1,v2) (illustrated beside the sketch of this proof, in Figure 5).
There are two special vertices, a source s and a sink t. The other vertices in our
network are the locations Ω and the cells Πˆ of the game. There is an edge from s
to every (i;pii) ∈ Πˆ, where κ(s,(i;pii)) = Ki, and an edge from every location ω ∈ Ω
to t, where κ(ω,t) = f(ω). Also, there is an edge from a cell (i;pii) ∈ Πˆ to a location
ω iff pii contains ω, and the flow capacity κ of such edges is infinite (for a textbook
presentation of flow networks; see, e.g., Cormen et al., 2009, Ch. 26).
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A cut of D is a subset of edges C ⊂E, such that if all the edges of C are removed
then there exists no path between s and t. Suppose that C is a minimal cut, i.e., a
cut whose sum of capacities is minimal. Then C certainly does not include any edge
between a cell and a location, as those edges have an infinite flow capacity. Let Q=
{ω ∈ Ω : (ω,t) ∈ C} denote the locations that the cut separates from t. Denote W =
Ω \Q. Then C must include all the edges {(s,(i;pii)) : i ∈ N,pii∩W 6= ∅}; otherwise
there would still exist a path from s to t. Hence, the total capacity of C equals
∑
ω∈Q
κ(ω,t) +
∑
i∈N
∑
pii∩W 6=∅
κ(s,(i;pii)) =
∑
ω∈Q
f(ω) +
∑
i∈N
∑
pii∩W 6=∅
Ki =
∑
ω∈Q
f(ω) +
∑
i∈N
Ki · |{pii ∈ Πi : pii∩W 6= ∅}| ≥
∑
ω∈Q
f(ω) +
∑
ω∈W
f(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
f(ω).
Therefore, the cut that consists of all edges of type (ω,t), whose total capacity equals∑
ω∈Ω f(ω), is minimal.
A flow in D is a function ϕ : E → R+ such that: (i) the flow never exceeds the
capacity, i.e., ϕ(e)≤ κ(e), and (ii) the overall flow outgoing from s, namely, the sum
of flows on edges outgoing from s, equals the overall flow incoming to t, namely, the
sum of flows on edges incoming to t (call this quantity the value of the flow), and for
any other vertex the incoming flow equals the outgoing flow. The max-flow min-cut
theorem (Cormen et al., 2009, p. 723, Theorem 26.6) states that the value of the
maximal flow equals the total capacity of the minimal cut; therefore, D admits a flow
ϕ of value ∑ω∈Ω f(ω), and so it must be the case that ϕ(ω,t) = f(ω) for every ω ∈Ω.
Now define a coordinated-search profile τ by letting τi(pii,ω) = ϕ((i;pii),ω) for ev-
ery i∈N ,pii ∈Πi, and ω ∈ pii. To see that this is a coordinated-search profile we verify
that for any pii,
∑
ω∈pii τi (pii,ω) =
∑
ω∈pii ϕ((i;pii),ω) = ϕ(s,(i;pii)) ≤ κ(s,(i;pii)) = Ki
(where the second equality is due to the equality of the outgoing and the incom-
ing flow). To see that τ induces f , we verify that for any ω, it is the case that∑
i∈N τi (pii(ω),ω) =
∑
i∈N ϕ((i;pii(ω)),ω) = ϕ(ω,t) = f(ω).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4 (Any fτ is Feasible)
A nonnegative matrix A is doubly stochastic (resp., doubly substochastic) if the sum
of the elements in each row and in each column is equal to (resp., at most) one, i.e.,
if ∑jAij = 1 (resp., ∑jAij ≤ 1) for each row i and ∑iAij = 1 (resp., ∑iAij ≤ 1) for
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each column j. Note that any doubly stochastic matrix must be a square matrix (but
this is not the case for a doubly substochastic matrix). A doubly stochastic (resp.,
doubly substochastic) matrix is a permutation (resp., subpermutation) matrix if it
includes only zeros and ones, i.e., if Aij ∈ {0,1} for any i, j. Note that a permutation
(resp., subpermutation) matrix includes exactly (resp., at most) one non-zero value
in each row and in each column, and this value is equal to one. The Birkhoff–von
Neumann theorem states that any doubly stochastic matrix can be written as a convex
combination of permutation matrices. Formally:
Theorem 3 (Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem). Let A be a doubly stochastic matrix.
Then there exists a finite set of permutation matrices P 1, ...,PK such that A =∑
kwk ·P k, where wk ≥ 0 for each k and
∑
kwk = 1.
We present a simple extension of Thm. 3 that states that any doubly substochastic
matrix can be written as a convex combination of subpermutation matrices.11
Lemma 2. Let A be a doubly substochastic matrix. Then there exists a finite set of
subpermutation matrices Q1, ...,QK s.t. A = ∑kwk ·Qk, where wk ≥ 0 for each k
and ∑kwk = 1.
Proof. Let I (resp., J) be the number of rows (resp., columns) in the matrix A.
We construct a square doubly stochastic matrix B with I+J rows and columns by
merging 4 submatrices (as illustrated in Figure 10): (1) the matrix A (with I rows
and J columns) in the top-left part of B, (2) a J×J diagonal matrix in the bottom-
left part of B, where each diagonal cell completes the values in each column of A
to one, (3) an I× I diagonal matrix in the top-right part of B, where each diagonal
cell completes the values in each row of A to one, and (4) the J × I matrix AT (the
transpose of A) in the bottom-right part of B. It is immediate that B is a doubly
stochastic matrix. By Theorem 3 there exists a finite set of permutation matrices
P 1, ...,PK (with I +J rows and columns) such that B = ∑kwk ·P k, where wk ≥ 0
for each k and ∑kwk = 1. Let Qk be a submatrix of P k with the first I rows and
J columns. Then it is immediate that each Qk is a subpermutation matrix and that
A=∑kwk ·Qk.
Next we rely on Lemma 2 to prove Proposition 4. Let τ be a coordinated-search
profile. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, we define a cell-unit as a tuple
11One can show that Lemma 2 is implied by the extension of the Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem
presented in Budish et al. (2013). For completeness, we provide a self-contained proof of the lemma.
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Figure 10: Illustration of How to Construct the Square Matrix B
(i, j,pii), where i ∈N is a player, j ∈ {1, ...,Ki} is an index corresponding to one unit
of capacity of player i, and pii ∈Πi is a cell of player i. Let Πˆ denote the set of all cell-
units with a typical element pˆi, let Πˆi denote the subset of cell-units that correspond
to player i, and let Πˆi,j denote the subset of cell-units that correspond to capacity
unit j ∈ {1, ...,Ki} of player i. We write ω ∈ pˆi = (i, j,pi) if ω ∈ pi.
A coordinated-search action profile (of the cell-units) is a function τ ′ that assigns
to each cell-unit (i, j,pi) an element of D (pi,1) (recall that an element of D (pi,1) is
a function η : pi → [0,1] such that ∑ω∈pi η (ω) ≤ 1). The coordinated-search profile
τ can be represented as an equivalent coordinated-search action profile (of the cell-
units) τ ′ that satisfies ∑Kij=1 τ ′ ((i, j,pii) ,ω) = τi (pii,ω) for each pii ∈ Πi and ω ∈ Ω.
The equivalent coordinated-search action profile τ ′ can be represented as a
∣∣∣Πˆ∣∣∣×|Ω|
nonnegative matrix C as follows:
C(i,j,pii),ω =
τ
′ ((i, j,pii) ,ω) ω ∈ pii ∈ Πi
0 otherwise.
Observe that the sum of each row in C is at most one, i.e., ∑ω∈ΩCpˆi,ω ≤ 1, but the
sum of a column might be greater than one. Let A be the matrix derived from C by
decreasing the values of the lower cells within columns whose sum is greater than one,
such that the sum of each column is at most one. Formally (where we write pˆi′ < pˆi if
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the row of pˆi′ is higher than the row of pˆi in the matrix C):
Apˆi,ω =

Cpˆi,ω
∑
pˆi′≤pˆiCpˆi′,ω ≤ 1
1−∑pˆi′<pˆiCpˆi′,ω ∑pˆi′<pˆiCpˆi′,ω ≤ 1<∑pˆi′≤pˆiCpˆi′,ω
0 ∑pˆi′<pˆiCpˆi′,ω > 1.
Observe thatA is a doubly substochastic matrix (i.e., the sum of each row and of each
column is at most one), and that the coordinated-search action profile corresponding
to A induces the same mixed outcome as τ . By Lemma 2, there exists a finite set of
subpermutation matricesQ1, . . . ,QK such thatA=∑kwk ·Qk, where wk ≥ 0 for each
k and ∑kwk = 1. Further observe that each subpermutation matrix Qk corresponds
to the cell-unit representation of a pure strategy profile sk, which implies that τ
induces the same mixed outcome as the correlated strategy profile σ =∑kwk · sk.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 5 (Intersecting Signals)
Let M = {i ∈N : |Πi| ≥ 2} be the set of players whose partitions are not trivial (i.e.,
players that have at least two cells in their partition), and denote m= |M |. For any
player i ∈ N , location ω ∈ Ω, and any tuple of cells (pij)j 6=i, the profile of n cells
(pii (ω) ,(pij)j 6=i) has at least κ locations in its intersection. Thus, pii (ω) contains at
least κ ·∏j∈N\i |Πj | such intersection points, and
κ · ∏
j∈N\i
|Πj |= κ ·
∏
j∈M\i
|Πj | ≥ κ ·2m−1.
Hence, |pii (ω)| ≥ κ ·2m−1. Suppose first thatM 6= ∅. Now consider a smaller, auxiliary
search game created by omitting all players in N \M , leaving only members of M to
play. Since κ · 2m−1 ≥ κ ·m and Ki ≤ κ, Corollary 4 implies that the smaller game
admits a redundancy-free strategy sM . If M = ∅ then sM is empty and the proof
proceeds the same.
Under sM ,
∑
i∈MKi ·|Πi| distinct locations are searched. Going back to the original
game, we define a strategy profile s by complementing sM with strategies of the
members of N \M as follows. We let them choose, one by one (within their single
cell, namely, the whole Ω), any Ki locations that have not been chosen by other
players yet, as long as there are such.
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Case 1: Assume that ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|. This implies that this procedure con-
tinues until all members of N \M have chosen. We end up with a strategy profile
s that is redundancy-free. Observe that s is also exhaustive iff ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| = |Ω|,
and that if ∑i∈NKi · |Πi|< |Ω| then the game does not admit an exhaustive strategy
profile (as the players can search in at most ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| locations).
Case 2: We are left with the case of ∑i∈NKi · |Πi| > |Ω| in which the procedure
cannot be completed, as at some stage all the locations will already have been chosen
before all the players have been able to choose. Let the remaining players choose
arbitrarily. We end up with an exhaustive strategy profile s.
If the payoffs are solitary-search dominant then, either when s is redundancy-free
or when s is exhaustive, Corollary 2 implies that G also admits such an equilibrium.
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